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GOVERNMENTAL MISCONDUCT AND
THE RIGHT OF LIBERTY
Michael A. Vaccari*
I. Introduction
The essence of the liberty interest guaranteed by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution is the protection of the individual from con-
duct by the government which is capricious, arbitrary or unreason-
able.1 When a defendant is brought to trial and convicted as a re-
sult of such conduct by law enforcement officials even though such
conduct is not specifically proscribed by the fourth and fifth
amendments,2 that defendant's right to liberty has been violated.
The remedy advocated to cure this constitutional violation is the
recognition and application of an exclusionary rule which would
suppress any evidence obtained by such means.'
A small but increasing number of cases have accepted the idea
that law enforcement misconduct may violate a defendant's due
process rights.4 A recent New York case, People v. Rao,' exempli-
* Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York. B.A. 1975, J.D. 1978, Fordham
University.
1. "Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those
personal immunities. .. 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). See
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal'Procedure, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 929 (1965).
2. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty and Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 411-14 (1977).
3. Although the exclusionary rule usually is associated with violations of the fourth
amendment, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence seized in violation of
fourth amendment inadmissible at trial), the rule is generally available as a remedy for vio-
lations of constitutional rights. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (sixth amend-
ment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (fourteenth amendment). See also Note, The Briefcase Caper, Standing
and Due Process Exclusion: United States v. Payner, 10 CONN. L. REv. 210, 217-22 (1977);
Note, Standards for the Suppression of Evidence Under the Supreme Court's Supervisory
Power, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 364 (1977). See generally Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusion-
ary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by
the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961).
4. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (dicta); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978); People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d
88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471
(1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973);
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fies the willingness of certain courts to look to the due process
clause as a means of striking down indictments or suppressing evi-
dence obtained through egregious governmental misconduct. In
Rao, members of the office of the Special Prosecutor appointed to
ferret out corruption in the criminal justice system committed nu-
merous illegalities while obtaining indictments against a judge, his
attorney-son and the son's law partner. In obtaining these indict-
ments, which were later dismissed, the Special Prosecutor may well
have been guilty of committing or aiding in the commission of vari-
ous felonies and misdemeanors under the New York Penal Law in-
cluding perjury (swearing falsely before a grand jury), forgery (fal-
sifying public records), making an apparently sworn false
statement (intending to mislead a public servant in the perform-
ance of his official functions), perjury (offering a false statement
for filing) and falsely reporting an incident (reporting to a law en-
forcement agency information known by him to be false). Al-
though all three defendants sought and eventually obtained dis-
missals of their indictments, one dismissal was based squarely on
the ground of prosecutorial misconduct.
7
Rao raises the question whether a defendant who has been in-
dicted and brought to trial as a result of illegal conduct perpe-
trated by law enforcement officials is entitled to constitutional pro-
tection from that misconduct. Such protection is necessary to 1)
provide a remedy for this type of conduct and 2) prevent similar
and more egregious acts in the future. The extremes to which such
conduct can extend are illustrated by the attempted burglary of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office by the White House Plumb-
ers8 and by a recent case in which it was argued before the United
Nigrone v. Murtaugh, 46 A.D.2d 343, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd on other
grounds, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975).
5. 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980).
6. 46 A.D.2d 343, 350, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 521-22 (2d Dep't 1974) (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
7. People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 95, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (2d Dep't 1980) (court found
law enforcement misconduct so "calculated, insidious and pervasive" as to require dismissal
of the indictment on due process grounds).
8. See Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the
United States Senate, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. Report No. 93-981, June 1974, at 119-130; REPORT
OF THE WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE 60-62 (1975). See also G. LIDDY, WILL
(1980); Jaworski, The Most Lustrous Branch: Watergate and the Judiciary, 45 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1267 (1977); N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1980 at A17, col. 1 (in testimony at the trial of
former FBI agents accused of unlawful entries, former President Richard Nixon stated that
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States Supreme Court that the commission of murder to further
governmental interests could be justified, under certain circum-
stances by the Constitution."
Although there is no specific constitutional provision which pros-
cribes law enforcement misconduct other than the specific in-
stances described in the fourth and fifth amendments, courts,
when faced with egregious behavior, have looked to the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as general protec-
tors of fairness in governmental actions toward individuals. 10 Fur-
thermore, at least two courts have reversed, on due process
grounds, convictions obtained as a result of law enforcement
illegality."
The fourth and fifth amendments of the Constitution place spe-
cific limitations on the actions of government officials in the inves-
tigation of criminal conduct. These proscriptions, the defense of
entrapment and the use of the due process clause as a general limi-
tation on egregious actions by law enforcement agents will be dis-
cussed in section II. Section III will offer an analysis of the nature
and scope of the due process right of liberty. This analysis includes
a philosophical discussion of the function of law as it relates to the
protection of the liberty interest. It is asserted than an interpreta-
when a president authorizes burglaries "for good cause, what would otherwise be unlawful or
illegal becomes legal.").
9. In McSurly v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. granted, 434
U.S. 868 (1977), writ of cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. McAdams v.
McSurly, 438 U.S. 189 (1978), attorneys for defendant congressman argued that the com-
mission of murder, for the purpose of obtaining information relevant to legislation, was
within the immunity granted to members of congressional staffs under the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution. The New York Times reported part of the oral argument:
Associate Justice Potter Stewart asked Mr. Easterbrook whether a Senate investiga-
tor who committed burglary to obtain a document relevant to legislation would be
immune from a damage suit.
"Yes, probably he is protected," the Deputy Solicitor General replied.
"Would that include murder?" asked the justice.
"Yes, probably," Mr. Easterbrook responded.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1978, at As, col. 1.
10. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. See also O'Connor, Entrapment Versus
Due Process: A Solution to the Problem of the Criminal Conviction Obtained by Law En-
forcement Misconduct, 7 FORDHAM URw. L.J. 35, 48-53 (1978); Note, Standards for the Sup-
pression of Evidence Under the Supreme Court's Supervisory Power, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
364, 370-72 (1977).
11. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978); People v.
Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980).
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tion of the due process clause which includes protection from law
enforcement illegality is consistent with the views of the major
contemporary political philosophers on the source and function of
the liberty interest.12
Section IV posits the legal basis for recognizing constitutional
protection of the liberty interest from law enforcement illegality.
The legal basis for this right will be developed through an analysis
of the principles underlying particular constitutional provisions
seeking to secure the liberty of individuals and the application of
such principles to the area of law enforcement illegality.
II. The Law of Governmental Misconduct
The parameters of proper conduct of law enforcement officials
toward criminal suspects and defendants has been intensively ana-
lyzed by the courts. Certain types of governmental misconduct are
proscribed by specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Among these
are the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the fifth amendment prohibition against
compulsory self-incrimination.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court first discussed the effect of the fourth
amendment's 3 proscription against unreasonable search and
seizure in Boyd v. United States.4 Since Boyd, the court has
struggled with both the underlying theory and the practical conse-
quences of the amendment. Because no remedy for violations of
the amendment exists in the Constitution, much of the discussion
has centered on proposed remedies. Recently, the question of
standing, or who has the capacity to assert a violation of fourth
12. See notes 140-53 infra and accompanying text.
13. The fourth amendment provides in part that "[tihe right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, government officials relied upon a federal statute re-
quiring a defendant to produce certain books and records. Under the statute, if the materi-
als were not produced, the allegations sought to be proved by the material would be taken
as admitted. Id. at 621. For a discussion of the historical development of the fourth amend-
ment, see Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to
Challenge Search and Seizure, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1, 3-14 (1975); Lasson, The History and
Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 13-15 in 55
JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUDIES IN HIST. & POL. Sci. No. 2 (1937).
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amendment rights, has occupied the attention of the Court.
The early decisions construing the fourth amendment focused on
the conduct of the government officials. Justice Bradley, writing in
Boyd, recalled the abhorrence that general writs of assistance (is-
sued by the Crown to allow British officials to enter and search the
homes of suspected colonial smugglers) created in eighteenth cen-
tury Americans."5 He also noted the rights of privacy and property
were violated by an illegal search. "It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging in his drawers, that constitutes the es-
sence of the offense, - it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property. . ... "
The Court held that the fourth amendment protected an individ-
ual from the compulsory production of papers to be used against
him, even if, as in Boyd, those papers had not been seized.
After Boyd, the question remained whether evidence could be
used at trial even though it had been seized illegally. The common
law rule stated that a court would not inquire into the source of
competent evidence. 17 In Weeks v. United States,"5 however, the
Supreme Court declared that if the common law rule were adhered
to "the protection of the Fourth Amendment. . . might as well be
stricken from the Constitution." 9 The Court, therefore, prohibited
the use at federal trials of even competent evidence, if it had been
illegally obtained.20 Justice Day defended this exclusionary rule in
two ways: first, the rule was necessary to give force to the specific
proscriptions of the fourth amendment, and second, that a under
clean-hands theory, judicial integrity should be preserved by ex-
15. According to Justice Bradley, in 1761 James Otis described the general writs as" 'the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the funda-
mental principles of law that ever was found in an English law book.'" 116 U.S. at 625.
16. 116 U.S. at 630.
17. See 1 GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 254a (1866). See also Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
585, 595 (1904); Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met. 329, 337 (Mass. 1841).
18. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
19. Id. at 393.
20. The scope of the exclusionary rule was extended in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1925), where the Supreme Court prohibited the government
from using not only the illegally seized evidence itself, but also any knowledge the govern-
ment had gained therefrom. Id. at 390-91. The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For a thorough analysis of the develop-
ment of the exclusionary rule, see Comment, Reason and the Fourth Amendment - The
Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139 (1977).
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cluding evidence illegally obtained.2
During the tenure of Chief Justice Warren, the Supreme Court
added another rationale for the exclusionary rule. Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court in Elkins v. United States,22 stated that "the
[exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its pur-
pose is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effectively available way - by removing the in-
centive to disregard it."2s Whether the constable on patrol does in
fact alter his practices based on Supreme Court dictates and is'
thereby deterred from illegal intrusions continues to be the subject
debate. Skepticism regarding the deterrence value of the exclusion-
ary rule has been a hallmark of the Burger Court, which has ac-
tively engaged in limiting the application of the rule wherever
possible.2 4
Another aspect of the law of search and seizure that has been
modified since Boyd is the reliance on property concepts to define
a search.25 The invention of the radio heralded a revolution in
communications that irreversibly altered the ways in which a gov-
ernment could intrude upon its citizens. Although the Court heard
its first wiretapping and electronic surveillance cases in the 1920's,
it was not until 1967 that the Court recognized a wiretap as a
search deserving of constitutional protection. In Katz v. United
States,26 a listening device was planted in the telephone booth reg-
ularly used by a known gambler. Although there had been no phys-
ical intrusion, the Court found a violation of the fourth amend-
ment, holding that the Constitution protects "people, not
places.'27 In later cases, the Court refined the concept so that the
fourth amendment is now recognized to protect only a "legitimate
21. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 392.
22. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
23. Id. at 217.
24. See Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1040-41
(1973). See generally Comment, Possession and Presumptions: The Plight of the Passenger
Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1027, 1061-62 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Possession]; Comment, The Exclusionary Rule, Standing and Expectation of Privacy for
Car Passengers: A Confusion of Concepts, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 227, 228 (1979); Comment,
Reason and the Fourth Amendment - The Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 139, 158-73 (1977).
25. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 n.4 (1978).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. Id. at 351.
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expectation of privacy." 8
A third area where the Court has limited fourth amendment pro-
tection is the question of standing. The Supreme Court has stated
that fourth amendment rights are personal and may not be as-
serted vicariously.29 Therefore, only those whose "legitimate expec-
tation of privacy" is violated may assert a violation of the fourth
amendment."0 The Supreme Court has further limited the availa-
bility of standing to challenge "unreasonable searches and
seizures" and circumscribed the protective scope of the fourth
amendment in three recent decisions. In Rakas v. Illinois,' the
Court denied standing to passengers in an automobile because they
lacked the requisite expectation of privacy in a car they neither
possessed nor were driving. The automatic standing rule, which the
Court created in Jones v. United States32 to deliver a defendant
charged with a possessory crime from the dilemma of having to
assert a property interest in contraband in order to challenge an
illegal search, was overruled by the Court in United States v.
Salvucci.3 Finally, in United States v. Payner 4 the Court found
that an illegal search of a party other than the defendant could not
form the basis of a defendant's fourth amendment claim because
the defendant's own legitimate expectation of privacy had not been
violated."
B. Fifth Amendment
The history of the fifth amendment prohibition against compul-
sory self-incrimination is similar to the history of the exclusionary
rule under the fourth amendment. In Bram v. United States," the
Supreme Court established the basic principle that in criminal tri-
28. Id. at 353.
29. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
30. It has been suggested that the court's limiting of standing is an aspect of its unapo-
logetic dislike of the exclusionary rule. See Possession, supra note 24, at 1032. In Rakas, the
court stated "Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for
the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights." 439 U.S. at 137 (1978).
31. 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978). See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561-62
(1980).
32. 362 U.S. 257, 263-65 (1960).
33. 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2553 (1980).
34. 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
35. Id. at 2444.
36. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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als, confessions must be free and voluntary.3 7 In the years following
Brain, the determination of the requisites for a free and voluntary
confession occupied most of the court's attention. 8 The Court
characterized as involuntary those confessions which resulted from
extreme brutality 9 as well as those resulting from milder forms of
coercion. 40 The Court held this provision of the fifth amendment
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan.41 The effort by the Su-
preme Court to define a truly voluntary confession culminated in
Miranda v. Arizona,4" where the Court held that a formal explana-
tion of rights must be given a suspect before a confession can be
considered voluntary for the purposes of the fifth amendment."
C. Entrapment
The defense of entrapment44 received formal recognition in Sor-
37. Id. at 542.
38. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,
266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924).
39. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (confessions were obtained from four
black defendants through extended sessions of whipping and in one case by hanging).
40. The defendant, in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), was denied permis-
sion to call his laywer or his wife until he "cooperated." Justice Goldberg writing for the
majority stated, "Whether there is involved the brutal 'third degree,' or the more subtle, but
no less offensive, methods of obtaining, official misconduct cannot but breed disrespect for
law, as well as for those charged with its enforcement." Id. at 519.
41. 378 U.S. 1, 2, (1964). Before this provision of the fifth amendment was made applica-
ble to the states, the Court excluded coerced confessions in state trials as violative of the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155
(1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228 (1940).
42. 354 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. Id. at 467-79. Chief Justice Warren observed that underlying the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is "the respect a government - state or federal - must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." Id. at 460. For the history of the privi-
lege, see Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 1-23 (1949).
The Burger Court has systematically limited the effect of the Miranda decision to testi-
mony given at a criminal trial for the purposes of proving guilt. See Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (Miranda warnings not required if a suspect is not in police
custody); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (testimony given without Miranda safe-
guards admissible to impeach defendant's credibility). But see Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S.
Ct. 1682 (1980) (interrogation for Miranda purposes includes any words or action by police
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response).
44. For articles analyzing the defense of entrapment, see Murchison, The Entrapment
Defense in Federal Courts: Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L.J. 573 (1976); Murchison,
The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Evidence of a Legal Doctrine, 47 Miss. L.J.
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rells v. United States." In Sorrells, a government agent repeatedly
and persistently asked the defendant to obtain some whiskey for
him. Despite refusing these repeated supplications, the defendant
finally procured a half-gallon of whiskey as a favor for the agent,
who had ingratiated himself with the defendant by claiming that
they were veterans of the same World War I army unit.' 6
The Supreme Court established that the defense of entrapment
is available "when the criminal design originates with the officials
of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute.'4 7 The Court distin-
guished this situation from the situation in which government offi-
cials "merely afford[ed] opportunities or facilities for the commis-
sion of the offense.' 8 Justice Roberts, concurring, believed that
the creation of an entrapment defense based on a defendant's pre-
disposition was inappropriate because the true issue was the in-
volvement of the court in sanctioning official misconduct." An en-
trapment defense according to Justice Roberts should place "the
true foundation of the doctrine in the public policy which protects
the purity of government and its processes.""0
In Sherman v. United States,51 a police informant met the de-
fendant at a doctor's office while both were being treated for drug
211 (1976). See also Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related Problems in Crimi-
nal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 399 (1959); Note, Entrapment by Federal Officers, 33
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033 (1958); Comment, Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1 U.S.F. L. REV.
177 (1966). But see DeFeo, Entrapment As A Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its His-
tory, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REv. 243 (1967). Additionally, several authors
have argued that a constitutional foundation existed for the entrapment defense. See Com-
ment, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts, and Some State Court Compari-
sons, 49 CiM. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959); Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea For Con-
stitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63 (1967); Comment, Elevation of Entrapment To
A Constitutional Defense, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 361 (1974); Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me
And I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YAL L.J. 942
(1965).
45. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
46. Id. at 439.
47. Id. at 442.
48. Id. at 441.
49. Id. at 454-55 (Roberts, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 455. Justice Roberts added, "It is the province of the court and of the court
alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitutions of the criminal law." Id.
at 457.
51. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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addiction. A friendship developed and soon thereafter the inform-
ant asked the defendant to obtain drugs for him. Only after re-
peated urgings did the defendant obtain the drugs, which he then
sold to the informant at cost. Defendant was arrested by federal
agents and convicted despite his asserted defense of entrapment."
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles underlying Sorrells
but stated that in determining whether evidence established en-
trapment "a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." 3 The Court was
particularly outraged that the police provocateur had led the de-
fendant back into the life of drug addiction from which he was
trying to escape."
Four justices concurred in the result,55 but would have had the
Court adopt the rationale of Justice Roberts' concurrence in Sor-
rells." Justice Frankfurter concurring again emphasized that
"public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of jus-
tice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the tran-
scending value at stake. '57
Fifteen years passed before the Supreme Court had another op-
portunity to examine the entrapment doctrine. 8 In United States
52. Id. at 371-72.
53. Id. at 372.
54. Id. at 373.
55. Id. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying
text.
56. 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The majority dealt briefly with the questions
raised by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, but refused to base its decision on the objective
grounds advocated in the concurrences. The Court stated that it was neither prepared to
overrule Sorrells nor to run the risk of creating greater problems which an approach focus-
ing on the conduct of government officials might entail. Id. at 376-78.
58. Between 1958 and 1973, the entrapment defense received increasing review by fed-
eral courts and in the literature. While most courts treated entrapment as a factual issue
focusing on the predisposition of the defendant (the subjective test), see cases cited in Mur-
chison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L.J.
573, 588 n.97 (1976), three circuit courts and one district court rejected the use of the sub-
jective test alone and reversed convictions by finding that, as a matter of law, improper
conduct by government officials established entrapment (the objective test). See United
States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 936, rehearing denied,
414 U.S. 883 (1973), opinion on remand, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974); Greene v. United
States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971),
appeal after remand, 470 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); United
States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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v. Russell,59 a federal undercover agent supplied a manufacturer of
methamphetamine ("speed") with a crucial ingredient, otherwise
extremely difficult, though not impossible, to obtain. A month af-
ter the illegal drug had been produced, the agent returned with a
warrant and arrested the defendant. The defendant was convicted
in a trial in which his sole defense was entrapment. The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed concluding as a matter of law "a defense to a criminal
charge may be formed upon an intolerable degree of governmental
participation in the criminal enterprise."60
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and reaffirmed
the subjective rationale of Sorrells, which looked to the defen-
dant's predisposition."1 The Court dismissed the argument that the
defense of entrapment had a constitutional basis in the fundamen-
tal concepts of due process,62 and rejected the analogy of the en-
trapment defense to the exclusionary rule. While noting that the
exclusionary rule has been recognized where defendants could
point to the violation of specific fourth or fifth amendment rights,
those defendants alleging entrapment could point to no indepen-
dent constitutional right interfered with by improper governmental
activity. Despite rejecting an approach to entrapment which would
focus on the conduct of governmental officials, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, observed, "we may some day be presented
with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is
so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from involving judicial processes to obtain a convic-
tion. .... "63 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Ninth
Circuit for trying to enlarge the scope of entrapment to include
59. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
60. Russell v. United States, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972).
61. 411 U.S. at 425. Justice Stewart, in dissent, argued that it was incorrect to focus on a
defendant's criminal disposition as the basis for entrapment. The defendant could have the
same predisposition and may well have committed the same crime whether he was en-
trapped by law enforcement agents or by a private party. Since he can only cry "entrap-
ment" if a law enforcement agent is the entrapper, the focus must be on the conduct of the
law enforcement agent. Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "The purpose of the entrapment
defense," wrote Justice Stewart, "[is] to prohibit unlawful governmental activity in instigat-
ing crime." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
62. See Comment, Entrapment - A Due Process Defense - What Process is Due, 11
S.W.U. L. RPv. 663 (1979); Comment, Elevation of Entrapment to a Constitutional De-
fense, 7 U. MICH. L. REV. 361 (1974).
63. Id. at 431.
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incidents of "overzealous law enforcement."''" Entrapment, accord-
ing to Justice Rehnquist, is a relatively limited defense and was
not intended to give the federal judiciary a " 'chancellor's foot'
veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve.'65
In its latest entrapment decision, Hampton v. United States,66
the Supreme Court held that the defense was not available to a
defendant who was convicted of selling heroin after a government
agent had supplied both the narcotic and the buyers. 7 Although a
majority of the Court reaffirmed Russell, only three justices would
have gone so far as to state that "the defense of entrapment could
[never] be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as
this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the
crime was established.""8
D. Due Process
The due process clause arguably is the constitutional provision
that would provide a citizen protection from governmental miscon-
duct which falls outside the specific confines of the fourth or fifth
amendments or the defense of entrapment. Yet, courts have only
grudgingly accepted the due process clause in this manner. This
section will explore the various areas in which the due process
clause has been put forward, successfully and unsuccessfully, as
protection against law enforcement misconduct.
If a single thread weaves throughout the cases that look to the
64. Id. at 435.
65. Id.
66. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
67. Id. at 486-89.
68. Id. at 488-89. Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the plurality opinion inso-
far as it applied Russell to the instant facts and made no legal distinction between the
crucial ingredient supplied in Russell and the contraband supplied to Hampton. Id. at 491
(Powell, J., concurring). The concurring justices disagreed with the plurality on the question
whether a due process defense would be available to one who had shown a predisposition to
commit a crime. While the plurality would find this defense unavailable, the concurring
justices stated that since this question was left open in Russell and Russell is dispositive of
the instant case, the question is still unanswered. Id. at 491, 492-93 (Powell, J., concurring).
The dissenting justices (Justice Stevens did not participate) adhered to the use of the
objective test. Moreover, they would find any instance where law enforcement agents sup-
plied an individual with contraband followed by an arrest for the possession or sale of that
contraband, to be entrapment as a matter of law. Id. at 499 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973);
United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975).
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due process clause as the constitutional element that protects citi-
zens against illegal conduct perpetrated by their government, it is
embodied in the eloquent words of Justice Brandeis, dissenting in
Olmstead v. United States.9
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall
be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by ex-
ample. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes the lawbreaker, it
breathes contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto him-
self; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law - the end justifies the means - to declare that government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal - would
bring terrible retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face.7 0
The Supreme Court's recognition of this view of the due process
clause was established in Rochin v. California.1 In Rochin, police
officers acting on a tip, broke into defendant's home. Forcibly
opening the door to defendant's bedroom, they observed him swal-
low two capsules. The officers unsuccessfully attempted to extract
the capsules from his mouth. The defendant was then taken to a
hospital where the officers directed a doctor to force an emetic so-
lution through a tube into Rochin's stomach, thereby causing the
vomiting of the two capsules which proved to contain morphine.72
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, found that the due
process clause imposed on the Supreme Court a duty to ascertain
whether the entire course of a proceedings including the actions of
law enforcement agents which lead to an indictment "offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notion of justice
of English-speaking peoples. . . . ,,7 Acknowledging the elusive na-
ture of due process, Justice Frankfurter maintained that the stan-
dards of due process are "deeply rooted in reason and in the com-
69. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The holding in Olmstead that a wiretap did not constitute a
search or seizure proscribed by the fourth amendment was overruled in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1961).
70. Id. at 485.
71. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
72. Id. at 166.
73. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
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pelling tradition of the legal profession and are thus not beyond
judicial capability to ascertain.7 Applying those standards, the
Court found the action of the California police to be "conduct that
shocks the conscience" and therefore, violative of the defendant's
right of due process."
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a defendant's due
process rights are not violated when the defendant is brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible abduc-
tion. '76 In Ker v. Illinois,7 an American citizen residing in Peru,
was indicted in Illinois for larceny and embezzlement. A warrant
for Ker's arrest was issued, although never served. Ker was forcibly
abducted in Peru by an agent of the State of Illinois and returned
to Illinois where he was tried and convicted. The Supreme Court
upheld the conviction, dismissing the events of the kidnapping as
"mere irregularities" in the manner in which custody was obtained,
and construed the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
as requiring only a fair indictment and trial. 8
In Frisbie v. Collins,79 a Michigan prisoner petitioned for habeas
corpus alleging that he had been brought to trial in Michigan after
being kidnapped, handcuffed, and blackjacked in Illinois by Michi-
gan police. The Court affirmed the conviction in the face of a due
process challenge holding that
the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact
that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a "for-
cible abduction." No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify over-
ruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of
law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of a crime after being
fairly appraised of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accor-
74. Id. at 171. Specifically, due process requires "an evaluation based on a disinterested
inquiry pursued in the spirit of science on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated,
on the detached consideration of conflicting claims [and] on a judgment not ad hoc and
episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a
progressive society." Id. at 172.
75. Id. at 172. The Court found the forced stomach pumping "methods too close to the
rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." Id.
76. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886).
See Comment, The Greening of a Poisonous Tree: The Exclusionary Rule and Federal
Jurisdiction over Foreign Suspects Abducted by Government Agents, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv.
181 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Greening of a Poisonous Tree].
77. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
78. Id. at 444.
79. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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dance with constitutional procedural safeguards.80
The majority of courts have adhered to the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine.81 The major case departing from the Ker-Frisbie rule is
United States v. Toscanino.8' In Toscanino, the defendant alleged
he was kidnapped unlawfully in Uruguay by United States govern-
ment agents who brutally tortured him and forcibly returned him
to the United States where he was tried and convicted for conspir-
acy to import narcotics. Toscanino argued that the judicial pro-
ceedings against him in New York were void because his presence
in the jurisdiction was obtained illegally.
The Second Circuit held that if Toscanino's allegations were
substantiated at an evidentiary hearing, the court would lack juris-
diction to prosecute him. The court arrived at this conclusion
through a three-step analysis.83 First, the court reviewed the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, pointing out that expansion of the concept of due
process postdated the creation of the Ker-Frisbie rule:
Since Frisbie the Supreme Court . . . has expanded the interpretation of
'due process.' . . . In an effort to deter police misconduct, the term has
been extended to bar the government from realizing directly the fruits of its
own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in bringing the accused to
trial.'
Second, the court quoted extensively from Justice Brandeis' dis-
sent in Olmstead v. United States.85 Finally, the court relied on
Rochin and Russell,86 concluding that outrageous non-violent con-
duct by government agents could reach constitutional due process
87
80. Id. at 522.
81. See Brown v. Fogel, 387 F.2d 692, 696 n.7 (4th Cir. 1967). See also United States v.
Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Tourney, 454 F.2d
326 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Sherwood, 435 F.2d 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 909 (1970); Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (8th Cir. 1969); Tynan v.
Eyman, 371 F.2d 764, 765-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968).
82. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 275.
84. Id. at 272.
85. See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
87. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (no violation of due process when
police make repeated illegal entries into home to install hidden microphone); Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (removal of blood from unconscious defendant not a due process
violation).
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By these references to Olmstead and Rochin, the Toscanino
court espoused the proposition that due process would bar a prose-
cution where it resulted "from flagrantly illegal law enforcement
practices."s The Second Circuit concluded:
[Tihe "Ker-Frisbie" rule cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's ex-
pansion of the concept of due process, which now protects the accused
against pretrial illegality by denying to the government the fruits of its ex-
ploitation of any deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness on its part ...
Accordingly, we view due process as now requiring a court to divest itself of
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as a
result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable inva-
sion of the accused's constitutional rights."
Toscanino presented a singular departure from the Ker-Frisbie
rule, but the decision must now be read in conjunction with two
subsequent Second Circuit decisions limiting its scope to circum-
stances involving brutality. Both United States ex rel Lujan v.
Gengler" and United States v. Lira9l involved the illegal abduc-
tion by government agents of fugitives outside the jurisdiction of
the trial court. Neither case, however, involved the occurrence of
brutality by government agents of the United States, although the
defendants in Lira were brutalized by officials of a foreign
government."
In Lujan,93 the court viewed the basis for the decision in Tos-
canino as relying on the brutal nature of the conduct as in Rochin
and on the suggestion in Russell that conduct by law enforcement
agents might one day be so outrageous as to violate due process.9'
According to the Lujan court, the significant factor in Toscanino
was not the occurrence of the illegal acts, but the degree of their
brutality." The Second Circuit distinguishing Toscanino reasoned:
In sum, but for the charge that the law was violated during the process of
transporting him to the United States, Lujan charges no deprivation greater
* than that which he would have endured through lawful extradition. We
88. 500 F.2d at 274.
89. Id. at 275.
90. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
91. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. Id. at 71.
93. 510 F.2d at 65.
94. Id. See Comment, The Greening of a Poisonous Tree, supra note 76.
95. 510 F.2d at 66.
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scarcely intend to convey approval of illegal government conduct. But we
are forced to recognize that, absent a set of incidents like that in Toscanino,
not every violation by prosecution or police is so egregious that Rochin and
its progeny requires nullification of the indictment.96
Lira further explained the holding in Toscanino9 7 The Second
Circuit in Lira stated that, Toscanino did not overrule the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, but rather, subjected it to the overriding principle
announced in Rochin that
where the Government itself secures the defendant's presence in the juris-
diction through use of cruel and inhuman conduct amounting to a patent
violation of due process principles, it may not take advantage of its own
denial of the defendant's constitutional rights. 8
A small number of courts have begun to recognize that due pro-
cess violations may occur in instances where elaborate law enforce-
ment schemes, occasionally involving even the judicial system, are
designed to catch government officials thought to be involved in
illegal activities. In United States v. Archer," the Second Circuit
discussed whether a due process violation resulted from an intri-
cate ruse in which a federal law enforcement official was falsely
charged with unlawful possession of a loaded pistol, thereby hop-
ing to infiltrate the criminal justice system and to expose corrup-
tion.100 After suggesting that he would be interested in getting the
charges dropped, the undercover agent became involved with a bail
bondsman, an attorney and an assistant district attorney who for
$15,000 arranged for the grand jury to return no true bill. 01
The Second Circuit expressed its distinct disapproval of the gov-
ernment's scheme, particularly because it involved lying to police
officers and perjury before judges and grand jurors. 10 2 Acknowledg-
ing that "mere recital" of the facts brought to mind Justice Bran-
deis' celebrated passage in Olmstead,'03 the Second Circuit also
noted that the doctrine subjecting government officials to the same
96. Id. at 70.
97. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975).
98. Id. at 70. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. See
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
99. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
100. Id. at 672-73.
101. Id. at 674.
102. Id. at 672.
103. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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rules of conduct as a citizen, had never commanded a majority of
the Supreme Court. Although the Archer court considered the ap-
plicability of a due process defense to the commission of illegality
by the government agent,' " it declined to resolve the case on that
basis. Rather, it chose the narrower ground of lack of federal juris-
diction to overturn the conviction.105 The Second Circuit acknowl-
edged the difficulties that a due process defense for law enforce-
ment illegality would create for courts.
We are not sure how we would decide this question if decision were re-
quired. Our intuition inclines us to the belief that this case would call for
application of Mr. Justice Brandeis' observation in Olmstead.... [Tihere
is certainly a limit to allowing government involvement in crime.
Governmental "investigation" involving participation in activities that re-
sult in injury to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be
extremely reluctant to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents naturally tend
to assign great weight to the societal interest in apprehending and convict-
ing criminals; the danger is that they will assign too little to the rights of
citizens to be free from government induced criminality.'"
A number of recent New York cases have considered the possi-
bility of a due process defense to law enforcement illegality. In
People v. Isaacson,10 7 the New York Court of Appeals dismissed an
indictment on the ground that the police conduct was so "repre-
hensible" that due process compelled the dismissal. The police
scheme commenced when an inveterate drug user and seller named
Breniman was arrested. About a month prior to the arrest of the
defendant in Isaacson, the police arrested Breniman for possession
of drugs and improperly induced from him an agreement to assist
them in setting up drug sales.108 Breniman contacted the defen-
104. Much of the discussion centered on Russell which had been decided two months
earlier. The court noted that the government relied on the Russell Court's reaffirmance of
the subjective theory of entrapment, while the defendant pointed to Justice Rehnquist's
admission that a situation could occur in which law enforcement misconduct might trigger a
due process violation. Id. at 676.
105. The federal agents had tried to create a violation of federal law by inducing the
defendants to make interstate phone calls. The court found that the three interstate phone
calls made by defendants did not violate the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976), which
makes illegal foreign or interstate travel in aid of racketeering.
106. 486 F.2d at 674.
107. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
108. Id. at 515, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. To enlist Breniman's aid as an
informant, the New York state police not only beat him but implied that they could be of
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dant, who lived in Pennsylvania, to arrange a sale of cocaine. Fear-
ful of New York's severe drug laws, the defendant declined to
make the sale. Only after seven phone calls and an appeal to the
defendant's sympathies, did the defendant agree to the sale. Aware
of the defendant's desire to avoid New York jurisdiction, Breniman
and the police managed to lure him into the state by moving the
location of the meeting place progressively northward until it was
to be held at a bar a few hundred yards into New York State.109
In analyzing the case, the court of appeals recognized that the
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime and, thus, the de-
fense of entrapment was unavailable to him. 1 0 The court, there-
fore, discussed whether there had been a violation of the defen-
dant's right of due process of law. Due process of law, the court
found, "guarantees respect for personal immunities 'so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as funda-
mental,'""" and that the use of the term is "but another way of
saying that every person's right to life, liberty and property is to be
accorded the shield of inherent and fundamental principles of
justice.""'Recognizing that due process is a flexible doctrine, the court pro-
assistance in his own case. At that time, however, the police were in possession of a lab
report informing them that the "amphetamines" found on Breniman were nothing more
than caffeine. Breniman was not informed of this development until after he had been of
service to the police. Id.
109. Id. at 517, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717. Although the court of appeals in
Isaacson condemned "the ugliness of police brutality," and "the police thirst for a convic-
tion," id. at 523, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720, other New York courts have taken a
different view of police schemes. In a New York State Supreme Court decision, People v.
Sims, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 26, 1979, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 1979), the court complimented
the police in the use of a ruse to arrest the defendant. In Sims, the police, having reasonable
cause to arrest the defendant, induced him by a lie to come voluntarily to the police station
for questioning about a robbery. The police did not inform the defendant that he was sus-
pected of murder until after he had arrived at the station house. While at the station, the
police arrested the defendant for illegal possession of a firearm. The court commended the
police conduct because at the time the police approached the defendant they believed he
was armed and dangerous and there were a large number of innocent bystanders in the area.
Id.
110. 44 N.Y.2d at 523-24, 378 N.E.2d at 84-85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721. There was no doubt
that defendant had sold drugs before and was therefore predisposed to commit the crime.
Id.
111. Id. at 520, 378 N.E.2d at 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.)).
112. Id. at 520, 378 N.E.2d at 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
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posed four factors "illustrative" of when police conduct manifests a
violation of due process: 1) whether the police manufactured a
crime which otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely
involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity; 2) whether the
police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repug-
nant to a sense of justice; 3) whether the defendant's reluctance is
overcome by appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy
or past friendship by temptation of exorbitant gain or by persis-
tent solicitation in the face of unwillingness; and 4) whether the
record reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no mo-
tive to prevent further crime or protect the populace. 13 Judge
Cooke, writing for the court, stressed that none of the factors were
singly dispositive of a due process violation, but rather "each
should be viewed in combination with all pertinent aspects and in
the context of proper law enforcement objectives. . . ." Further-
more, the court refused to limit the barring of prosecutions to con-
duct involving brutality,1 " stating that "[t]o prevent improper and
unwarranted police solicitation of crime, there is a need for courts
to recognize and to uphold principles of due process."" 5
Isaacson places New York in the vanguard of states recognizing
the existence of a due process defense to non-violent law enforce-
ment illegality. Significantly, the court held that the defense was
available to the defendant even though the illegal conduct was di-
rected at a third party."' Moreover, the court of appeals re-
113. Id. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (citations omitted). The court
rejected the argument of the dissenters that consideration of the four factors was irrelevant
because the improper conduct involved was directed at Breniman, not at the defendant. Id.
at 527, 378 N.E.2d at 87, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 723. The court stated:
While this harm was visited upon a third party, it cannot be overlooked, for to do so
would be to accept police brutality as long as it was not pointed directly at defendant
himself. Not only does the end not justify the means, but one shall not be permitted
to accomplish by indirection that which is not prohibited by direction.
Id. at 522, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720. The court noted further that the decep-
tion of Breniman, in addition to the physical brutality inflicted upon him, constituted im-
proper conduct which was sufficiently disruptive of justice so as to afford the defendant the
benefit of this defense. Id. at 524, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973).
115. 44 N.Y.2d at 520-21, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
116. The court of appeals based its decision on the due process clause of the New York
State Constitution. Id. at 519-20, 378 N.E.2d at 82, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718. This is an example
of a position advocated by Justice Brennan. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 498-502 (1977), which looks to the vari-
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sponded to Justice Rehnquist's concern that a due process defense
would amount to a "chancellor's foot" veto of state criminal proce-
dure by noting first, that courts exist to make judgments and have
the expertise to do so, and second, that courts do not have free
rein, but are rather, "circumscribed by a sizeable body of constitu-
tional and common law" construing the meaning of due process.1 '
Another attempt to ferret out corruption in the criminal justice
system ultimately resulted in the reversal of a conviction by the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court partially on
the ground of prosecutorial misconduct. In People v. Rao,'18 the
special prosecutor appointed to uncover corruption, purported to
arrest an undercover agent (using the name 'Vitale') on a false
criminal charge and fabricated a prior criminal record for the ar-
rested agent. For the false felony charge of armed robbery, bail was
set at $10,000 by a judge unaware of the ruse. A second undercover
agent, also unaware that the arrest was a hoax, sought the help of a
federal judge in the name of Vitale. The judge referred the agent
to his attorney-son who agreed to represent the arrested agent. A
grand jury indicted Vitale for robbery and larceny. Neither the
grand jurors nor the assistant district attorney who presented the
case knew of the ruse. Even though Vitale failed to appear and
forfeited his bail, the attorney-son was able to effect the return of
the $10,000 bail and a reduction of bail to $1,000." e Five months
later, the judge, his son and the son's law partner were requested
to appear before an Extraordinary Special Grand Jury (who were
aware of the Vitale hoax) regarding their part in attempting to in-
fluence the Vitale robbery case. Within a few weeks, all three were
indicted on counts of perjury for their denials of participation in
the Vitale affair.12 0
When the Appellate Division first heard the matter in 1974, all
five justices condemned the conduct of the special prosecutor 2 '
ous state constitutions as the primary protectors of civil rights.
117. 44 N.Y.2d at 524-25, 378 N.E.2d at 85, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
118. 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980).
119. Id. at 91, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
120. Nigrone v. Murtaugh, 46 A.D.2d 343, 344-45, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 515-16 (1974).
121. Justice Christ, writing for the majority, noted:
The deception of grand jurors, Judges and Assistant District Attorneys and the filing
of false official documents are absolutely intolerable. . . . When, as here, the criminal
justice system is made an unwitting accomplice of an overzealous prosecutor, before
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but a majority of three held that such misconduct did not taint the
proceedings against the defendants. 22 The court went on to state
that this case did not involve a situation, as described in United
States v. Russell, which was so outrageous as to violate due
process. 23
Justice Shapiro, joined by Justice Benjamin, dissented. The dis-
sent contended that this case was well within the category outlined
in Russell regarding non-entrapment due process violations and
stated, without specifying which constitutional rights he had in
mind, that the conduct evidenced a total disregard for "basic con-
stitutional rights." Justice Shapiro, citing Rochin, Archer and Tos-
canino as applicable, implicitly called for the overruling of the
Ker-Frisbie rule.12 4
Two years later, the Second Department reviewed the case a sec-
ond time and, in a memorandum decision, reinstated the indict-
ments after they had been dismissed by a lower court. 25 Justice
Titone, in a lengthy dissent, argued that the dismissal of the in-
dictments should be affirmed because abuses of the grand jury sys-
tem which had occurred were so egregious as to violate due
process.12 6
In 1980, the Second Department was afforded a third opportu-
nity to review the case which now involved the attorney-son as the
only remaining defendant.12 7 The indictments against the judge
and the son's law partner had been dismissed in 1977. Justice
Titone, now writing for the majority, dismissed the indictment as
the fact, its impartiality is destroyed and contempt for the law encouraged.
Id. at 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17.
122. 46 A.D.2d at 346, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
123. Id. at 350, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
124. Id. at 357, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 526. Justice Shapiro wrote:
To sanction the result of the prosecutor's conduct here while plaintively denying
what he did would deprive the words "due process" of any real meaning, and would
justify the cynicism about our judicial system now too widely and unjustifiably held
and would leave little incentive for this or other prosecutors to act within the bounds
of legal propriety.
Id. at 365, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 528 (Shapiro, J., dissenting).
125. People v. Rao, 53 A.D.2d 904, 386 N.Y.S.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1976).
126. Id. at 96, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 445 (Titone, J., dissenting).
127. People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980). The indictment
against the judge and the son's law partner had been dismissed in 1977. Id. at 93, 425
N.Y.S.2d at 126.
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violative of due process. 128
In his earlier dissent, Justice Titone would have been content to
dismiss the indictment solely on the basis of the abuse of the grand
jury system, developments, however, provided support for dismis-
sal of the indictment on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.
Justice Titone noted dicta in the New York Court of Appeals' pro-
cedural affirmance of the Second Department's 1974 decision re-
garding the possible invalidity of a prosecution designed to pro-
duce a crime. 2 9 In conclusion, he characterized the conduct by the
members of the Special Prosecutor's office in obtaining the
indictment:
The prosecutors concocted fictitious crimes, falsified records, duped Su-
preme Court Justices properly engaged in their judicial duties and orches-
trated the introduction before a grand jury of perjurious testimony of a
criminal activity which never occurred."30
As to this conduct, Justice Titone stated that "[nione of these
monstrous and patently illegal actions are or should be tolerated in
a free society, particularly when practiced by those sworn to en-
force the law and ferret out crime."'' The occurrence of these
abuses was "so calculated, insidious and pervasive"1' that it satis-
fied the "outrageous" scenario hypothesized by Justice Rehnquist
128. Id. at 97, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
129. In 1978, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Tyler, 46 N.Y.2d 251, 385
N.E.2d 1224, 413 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978), a case involving allegations of misconduct in public
office and the giving of false testimony before a grand jury, made the following statement:
It is not properly a principal aim of the Grand Jury, however, to "create" new crimes
in the course of its proceedings. Thus, where a prosecutor exhibits no palpable inter-
est in eliciting facts material to a substantive investigation of crime or official miscon-
duct and substantially tailors his questioning to extract a false answer, a valid perjury
prosecution should not lie. . . . Since no legitimate investigatory function is discern-
able in questioning designed primarily or solely to support a perjury prosecution
against the witness, it cannot be said that the responsive testimony, albeit false, frus-
trates any authorized purpose of the Grand Jury.
Id. at 259, 385 N.E.2d at 1228, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
In addition, at appellant's trial in Rao it was revealed for the first time that the Special
Prosecutor withheld evidence in his possession which was favorable to the defendant and
failed to disclose to the grand jury certain pertinent background information concerning the
credibility of one of the Special Prosecutor's witnesses. 73 A.D.2d at 95, 425 N.Y.S.2d at
126-27.
130. 73 A.D.2d at 96, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 127-28.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 97, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
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in Russell"' and thus constituted a violation of the defendant's
due process rights. "
III. The Due Process Right of Liberty and Law
Enforcement Illegality
In this section, an argument is advanced that the liberty interest
is the value which is offended by law enforcement illegality.13 5 Vio-
133. 411 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1973).
134. 73 A.D.2d at 98, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 129. The court noted:
It is clear that the requirements of due process in a given case may extend to pretrial
conduct of law enforcement authorities, and may also be invoked to bar prosecution
altogether where it resulted from illegal law enforcement practices (see United States
v. Toscanino (2d Cir.), 500 F.2d 267, 273) [sic]. Due process is now viewed as requir-
ing a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has
been acquired as a result of the government's deliberate, unnecessary and unreasona-
ble invasion of the accused's constitutional rights. (citation omitted).
Id.
135. Analysis of the liberty interest has been one of the chief concerns of many political
philosophers. The essence of these explanations is contained in the discussion of liberty in
the text. See notes 136-48 infra and accompanying text. According to John Rawls, "[a] per-
son's good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term plan of life given
reasonably favorable circumstances." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92-93 (1971). The abil-
ity to be free to pursue one's plan of life, however, requires the ability to be free to pursue
particular liberties:
Thus persons are at liberty to do something when they are free from certain con-
straints either to do it or not to do it and when their doing it or not doing it is
protected from interference by other persons ...
Id. at 202-03.
A clear example of the liberty interest is found in the first amendment's protection of free-
dom of speech: "freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-
fulfillment. The proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a
human being." T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970). But freedom
of speech also can serve to illustrate the "intricate complex of rights and duties" which
constitutes liberty. At first blush the rules of debate restrain and inhibit the participants in
the debate from fully expressing their position. However, in actuality, the rules protect and
enhance the right to speak. If there were no such rules, all the participants would be exercis-
ing their right simultaneously. The effect of such activity is to nullify the right. By violating
these rules, that is, by speaking out of turn, even if the motive is to protect the right to
speech, violates the rights of the other participants. The very purpose of the rules are con-
tradicted when one violates the rules in order to enforce their more adequate effectuation.
By imposing restraints each participant is afforded the opportunity to speak in an effective
manner. See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 203 (1971) (from which this example
is adopted).
John Locke, in THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, describes the relationship between
law and the liberty interest as follows:
For law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and
intelligent agent to his proper interest. . . . [T]he end of law is not to abolish or
RIGHT OF LIBERTY
lating the law in the course of attempting to enforce the law, does
not make the violation any less repugnant. This offense occurs
both when the violation has been condemned by a specific provi-
sion of the Constitution, such as the fourth and fifth amendments,
or, when the violation clearly offends the general principles of lib-
erty and justice which are embodied in the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments."3 6 This interest, is the right
of liberty, embodied specifically in the fourth and fifth amend-
ments and generally in the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. These amendments prohibit the federal
and state governments from depriving "any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.' 3 7
In order to understand the applicability of the due process right
of liberty to the context of law enforcement illegality, a philosophi-
cal foundation for the liberty interest must be provided. The un-
derstanding of the liberty interest which is set forth in this Article
is consistent with those legal philosophies which maintain, inter
alia, that 1) there are certain characteristics of human beings
which are attributable to all human beings; 2) these characteristics
are intelligible; 3) the presence of these characteristics gives
human beings a purpose in life; and 4) the existence of certain of
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom; for in all the states of created beings
capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom. . . Freedom is not as we
are told: a liberty for every man to do what he lists. . but a liberty to dispose, and
order, as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the
allowance of those laws under which he is; and therein not to be subject to the arbi-
trary will of another, but freely follow his own.
J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 57, at 32-33 (Library of Liberal Arts ed.
1952).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments protect similar values. It should be noted that state constitutions may soon be
playing a larger role in civil rights. The advantages of looking to the state constitutions to
provide even more stringent standards than does the federal constitution have been noted
by Justice Brennan. See generally Brennan, supra note 116, at 489. A concise expression of
the liberty interest is found in G. GiusEz & J. BOYLE, LIFE AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND
JusTIcE 453 (1979): "Liberty means the absence of imposed constraints to pursuing one's
own purposes in one's own way." See also Henkin, Constitutional Rights and Human
Rights, 13 H Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 593, 595-609 (1978).
137. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). See also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 65, 72 (1952); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267
(2d Cir. 1971); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978);
People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980).
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these characteristics requires that some conduct be permitted and
other conduct proscribed. The notion of the liberty interest as set
forth in this Article is compatible with the writings of three of the
most influential legal philosophers of our day as well as most of the
writings in the tradition commonly referred to as natural law.138
This analysis is necessary due to the scarcity of case law on lib-
erty interest as a basis for protection from governmental miscon-
duct. Although in section IV the argument is made that the accept-
ance by the Supreme Court of the understanding of liberty
proposed in this section would be consistent with the better rea-
soned decisions which have addressed the issue, the judicial rea-
soning in this area is in need of clear direction. This direction
should be based upon a reasonable and consistent philosophical
foundation compatible with the recognized understanding of
liberty.
A. The Liberty Interest
The first characteristic of the liberty interest is that it is intrin-
sic to individuals and not conferred upon them by society.1" The
individual does not relinquish the interest when he or she enters
society."1 0 Individuals exercise the interest within society by choos-
138. The three philosophers referred to in the text cover the spectrum of philosophical
thinking today. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See also L. FULLER, THE MORAL-
ITY OF LAW (1964); Bodenheimer, Seventy-Five Years of Evolution in Legal Philosophy, 23
Am. J. JURIS. 181 (1978); Henkin, Constitutional Rights and Human Rights, 13 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 593 (1978). In addition, this view of liberty is consistent with the natural law
tradition whose proponents include: E. BODENHEIMER, POWER, LAW, AND SOCIETY (1973); J.
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, LIFE AND DEATH
WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE (1979); J. MARITAN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951); J. MURRAY, WE
HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960); H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW (1948); Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (parts 1-2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365
(1925). For a modified version of natural law theory see Blackstone, The Relationship of
Law and Morality, 11 GA. L. REV. 1359, 1385-91 (1977). For a discussion of the application
of the theory in another legal system see Rommen, Natural Law in Decisions of the Federal
Supreme Court and of the Constitutional Courts in Germany, 4 NAT. L.F. 1 (1959). For an
example of a view of natural law theory which is not in accordance with the authors cited
above see Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral The-
ory, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1977).
139. While we may look to it as the memorialization of certain natural rights, the consti-
tution is not the ultimate source of those rights. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Back-
ground of American Constitutional Law (pts 1-2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1925).
140. The discussions which follow concerning the establishment of the societal plan and
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ing various component liberties or freedoms which together consti-
tute the liberty interest. 1" Examples of these component liberties
include the freedom to choose one's marriage partner, to travel in-
terstate or to adopt a child.
The exercise of liberty contributes to the development of one's
personhood or character and is the vehicle by which one's purposes
in life may be fulfilled. This quest for self-determination can in-
volve choices of two types: private or public. Society has no legiti-
mate concern with private choices,1 42 such as the freedom to be-
lieve in a religious creed. Other choices, such as decisions regarding
police or fire protection are essentially public, and individuals
must make such choices in conjunction with other members of
society.143
Even though some decisions remain essentially private, they are
made within the context of the society in which one lives. A pri-
mary example of this type of decision is the one to enter society in
the first instance. In entering society, individuals agree to a plan,
often described as a social compact or contract 44 because of the
the operation of the original position, see note 147 infra, do not reflect an historical account
of these matters. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 17-22 (1971). Rather, these
matters provide conceptual frameworks for determining what laws would be just regarding
the protection and curtailment of liberty given the philosophical understanding of liberty
advanced in the text.
141. Examples of these component liberties include the freedom to choose one's mar-
riage partner, the right to travel and the right to procreate. Under the rubric of "privileges
and immunities," Justice Washington, sitting alone on circuit, set out a list of those rights
perceived to be "natural and fundamental." Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1823). See also Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
142. See generally J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS ch. 8 (1980); Tribe,
The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forward: "Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process
of Life and Law," 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33-50 (1973).
143. Tribe, supra note 142, at 15 n.77 ("Even though the lines between the public and
private spheres occasionally blur and are at times illusory, we operate within the frame of a
constitutional scheme that treats the two differently." (citation omitted)).
144. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4-11 (Library of Liberal
Arts ed. 1952); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971). But see J. ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 14-16 (Hafner ed. 1947). Under Rousseau's social contract, the contract
itself is the source of legitimacy; whatever man can agree to include in the social contract
becomes part of the good. In contrast, the plan described in the text may contain nothing
contrary to natural law.
The Declaration of Independence is an eloquent example of the interaction of natural
rights, the state and the people:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,
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advantages societal existence offers for the liberty interest. By en-
tering into society one does not relinquish or subordinate the quest
for self-determination: if participation in society limited one's free-
dom, one would not enter society and participate in the establish-
ment of a societal plan. 145 The concern of individuals in establish-
ing this plan is twofold. They attempt, on the one hand, to provide
the conditions under which individuals can fulfill their duty to pre-
serve the liberty interest and, on the other hand, to create a politi-
cal setting where the right of individuals to exercise all the compo-
nent elements of liberty can be fostered. The concerns of the plan
are mutually dependent. The individual must have the ability to
pursue his quest for self-determination and his duty to do so must
be protected from infringements occasioned by his participation in
society.148
The quest for self-determination has two aspects: first, the duty
of the individual to preserve his freedom and second, the right of
the individual to preserve his liberty. The first aspect of the quest
for self-determination involves the duty of the individual to pre-
serve his freedom. The individual performs this duty through his
participation in the formulation of society's plan. In the original
position,'47 that is, at the time of the formulation of the plan, the
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are
instituted among men.
For a discussion of how the purposes set forth in the Declaration of Independence are incor-
porated in American constitutional theory, see Henkin, Constitutional Fathers - Constitu-
tional Sons, 60 U. MINN. L. REV. 1113 (1976). See also B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGIN
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55-93, 175-98 (1967); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 38-1 (1978).
145. See note 140 supra.
146. Although the Supreme Court never has recognized explicitly the quest for self-de-
termination as a fundamental right, it is the sine qua non for the exercise of many rights
which are recognized as fundamental. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (the
right to marry); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (the freedom of association); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right to procreate).
147. The framework of the original position, as developed by John Rawls, is an ex-
tremely useful tool for analyzing the scope of fundamental rights. An analysis of how society
should treat the quest for self-determination will benefit by considering how this right
would be appraised in the original position. Rawls describes the original position as follows:
[In the original position] no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural
fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It also seems widely agreed
that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one's own
case. We should insure further that particular inclinations and aspirations, and per-
sons' conceptions of their good do not affect the principles adopted. The aim is to
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individual, together with the other members of society, provide in
the plan for the just exercise of society's right to limit the freedom
of those members of society who may violate the rules set forth in
the plan. An example of this is the formulation of a system of
criminal law and procedure. Once agreed upon, the individual and
all members of society acquire the right to be treated fairly in ac-
cordance with such provisions.
The intent of this is twofold. First, the plan is designed to pro-
tect an individual against the transgressions of other members of
society. Second, it is designed to provide the individual with a fair
procedure when he is the subject of law enforcement. This is cru-
cial from the perspective of the original position, because individu-
als agree to the provision without the knowledge of whether they
may one day violate the law. Thus, an individual would only agree
to such a provision if he knew that in the event he should become
a lawbreaker, his freedom can be limited only by means which are
in conformity with fair and universal standards.
Individuals agree to the plan in order to safeguard liberty and to
protect certain values and conduct from infringement. Within the
plan, substantive criminal law and the law of criminal procedure
are formulated. They represent an independent set of values which
are deemed of such importance to the development of one's char-
acter, that society requires all of its members to respect such val-
ues and enforces them with the force of law. Whenever such inde-
pendent values are violated, their violation always is repugnant to
a sense of justice. The evil that occurs when an offense against
such values is committed is not defined by the identity of the of-
fender, but rather by the nature of the offense. Therefore, the
rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose for acceptance, however
little the chance of success, only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant from
the standpoint of justice. For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy, he might
find it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be
counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the con-
trary principle. To represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in
which everyone is deprived of this sort of information. One excludes the knowledge of
those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their
prejudices. . . . [T]hese conditions define the principles of justice as those which ra-
tional persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals when
none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural
contingencies.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-19 (1971).
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breaking of the law by an individual representing the state, even
though committed in the pursuit of one who has violated the law,
is no less an offense against justice. Whenever such values are vio-
lated, their violation always is repugnant to a sense of justice.
The second aspect of the quest for self-determination follows
closely from the first and involves the individual's right to preserve
his liberty. When an individual commits a public transgression, so-
ciety has the right to deprive the individual of the exercise of his
freedom, thereby impairing his quest for self-determination.14 8
From the point of view of the individual transgressor (or criminal),
however, this deprivation would be against his best interest. Al-
though his transgression subjects him to the just deprivation of his
liberty and he has no legitimate objection assuming that the au-
thorities have properly enforced the law, his quest for self-determi-
nation is not forfeited by his action. He has no obligation to "turn
himself in" or, in any way, assist the authorities in the procedures
which may lead to a limitation of his freedom.
The right to self-determination is inalienable and therefore can-
not be forfeited even by committing acts violative of the freedom
of others. The premise of the original position is that one does not
know what place one will have in society. Any individual in society
could turn out to be an offender. Thus, an individual would not
agree to enter society unless reasonable safeguards were estab-
lished to protect his liberty. The balance between the individual
safeguarding his own liberty and the need of society to protect it-
self against transgressions of its laws is struck by affording the in-
148. Imprisonment, or other types of punishment, while not eliminating the ability of an
individual to determine one's life, puts limitations on such freedom. The Supreme Court has
recognized that imprisonment has a negative impact on the liberty interest or lifestyle of an
individual because it can affect the ability to pursue certain goods and goals. Involuntary
confinement, either criminal or civil, involves a deprivation of the right of liberty protected
by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888).
In the context of prisoners' rights, the Supreme Court has also held that a criminal of-
fender has a due process liberty interest in securing parole release, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972), in the procedures involving the termination of probation, Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), in the provision of good-time credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974), and in the mechanism by which parole is determined, Greenholtz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). However, a prisoner has no due process interest in
the possibility of parole, Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), or in
avoiding transfers between penal institutions, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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dividual the right not to contribute to the curtailment of his own
liberty and by affording society the right to use certain designated
means to apprehend those who violate its laws.
The fifth amendment right of a criminal defendant to plead not
guilty is an example of a law which preserves the liberty interest.
This right is afforded the criminal defendant even if the defendant
has committed the crime with which he is charged. This right does
not conflict with society's right to prosecute individuals suspected
of criminal activity. Although society has a legitimate concern for
the prevention of criminal activity, this concern can only be
achieved within a context which respects the liberty interest. For
this reason, society has determined that in furthering its legitimate
interest in crime prevention, it is better for the guilty to go free
than for the innocent to be convicted. Thus, the primary concern
of the fifth amendment is not the conviction of all who are, in fact,
guilty but rather, the enhancement of universal liberty by respect-
ing the liberty interests of all."1 9
The recognition of the right against self-incrimination in the
context of criminal proceedings illustrates the twofold concern of
society's plan to protect the right of liberty. The fifth amendment
recognizes both the right of the individual to remain silent, thereby
not contributing to the deprivation of his liberty, and the right of
society to exercise its duty to preserve the liberty of all of its mem-
bers by prosecuting individuals in a manner consistent with fair
and universal standards. Violating a criminal defendant's fifth
amendment rights by coercing his confession infringes upon the
defendant's right to have his liberty interest respected by others
and inhibits his ability to preserve this interest. The criminal de-
fendant's right of liberty can also be violated by infractions of law
not directed immediately against the defendant. In the establish-
ment of the societal plan, the need to protect one's liberty would
be implemented by the probition of conduct impairing the freedom
of the individual, either immediately or ultimately.
Although the fifth amendment provides protection against a spe-
cific type of infringement by law enforcement officials, the princi-
149. Granting immunity is another example of society placing a greater importance on
protection of individual rights than in convicting those who are in fact guilty of the crime
charged. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See generally Comment, Im-
munity and Subsequent Informal Punishment, 69 J. CRIM. L. 322 (1978).
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ple upon which the amendment is based should be applied to any
illegality which would have the effect of impairing the liberty in-
terest. Although the commission of crime by an individual in-
fringes upon the freedom of other members of society, such in-
fringement, while it may limit certain freedoms of the individual,
does not require the criminal defendant to forfeit his right to the
just enforcement of the laws. The societal plan details the manner
in which violations of law will be resolved. If this plan can be
amended unilaterally by those with the authority to enforce the
laws, then the only difference between the criminal and the law
enforcement agent is that the agent has the solemn obligation to
uphold the law. This difference renders the agent's unilateral
amendment of the plan a violation of a far more grievous type.
IV. The Legal Basis for the Recognition of the
Defense of Law Enforcement Illegality
The argument for the recognition of the defense of law enforce-
ment illegality rests on two grounds. First, as suggested in section
II, the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
provide protection for individuals from intrusive conduct by offi-
cials, not found in the specific proscriptions of the fourth and fifth
amendments. Second, government use of law enforcement methods
not themselves legal, violates the standards of the social plan
under which the individual agreed to the possible suspension of his
freedom, by fair and universal means. 50
A. Fourth and Fifth Amendments Are Only
Components of Full Due Process Protection
The protections embodied in the fourth and fifth amendments
are not complete expressions of the fundamental principle they re-
present, rather they are components of the overall due process lib-
150. The use of the defense would preclude the introduction into evidence of any infor-
mation obtained by means of the illegal conduct. The practical effect of the defense will be
to bar most prosecutions predicated on such evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d
714 (1978); People v. Rao, 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980). In each of these
cases the courts held that the effect of the police misconduct was to deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the defendant rather than merely suppress the evidence obtained as a re-
sult of the illegality. It is the opinion of the author, however, that the application of the
exclusionary rule would provide a sufficient remedy.
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erty interest. Decisions by the Supreme Court in cases involving
the fourth and fifth amendments illustrate that the specific protec-
tion afforded by those provisions represent only particular expres-
sions of a more fundamental principle. In regard to the fourth
amendment, in Boyd v. United States 5" the Court made two ob-
servations: first, that the protections of the fourth and fifth
amendments were inextricably linked together;12 and second, that
the linkage of the amendments exists not simply in the protections
afforded by them on their face, but more importantly, in their
common purpose to protect the liberty of individuals.158 Justice
151. 116 U.S. at 633. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
152. The Court reasoned that protecting an individual from unreasonable search and
seizure or from attempts to force him to relinquish papers was a form of self-incrimination.
116 U.S. at 634-35. The Court has more recently mentioned the "intimate relationship"
between the fourth and fifth amendments in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
153. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Braun v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). If only
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights protect certain specific rights, then prior to the ap-
plication of the fifth amendment to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), coerced
confessions in state proceedings should have been unobjectionable. The Court, however, ex-
cluded coerced confessions in state trials before that time, as violative of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 173 (1944); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). This is another example of the Supreme Court's looking to the
due process clause as a residuary source of protection from government misconduct when no
specific constitutional provision has been breached. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
While the discovery of truth is a partial concern of the fifth amendment, see Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960), its primary
concern is with the right of liberty of individuals. After Malloy made the fifth amendment
applicable against the states, the Court declined to apply it retroactively, see Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 620 (1965), stating that
individuals convicted under such circumstances did not receive an unfair trial and that ret-
roactivity was unnecessary because it would have no effect on the outcome of the trial.
Rather the primary wrong which occured was the infringement upon the right of liberty of
individuals brought to trial in violation of the fifth amendment.
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the
ascertainment of truth. That privilege, like the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment,
stands as a protection of quite different constitutional values - values reflecting the
concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone.
Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (rule forbidding adverse comment regarding defen-
dant's failure to testify in criminal case should not be applied retroactively). An example
based on the sixth amendment provides further support for the proposition advanced in the
text. In both Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972), the Court considered the constitutionality of a less than unanimous verdict in crimi-
nal trials. Since the trial in Johnson occurred prior to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), in which the Supreme Court held the sixth amendment applicable to the states, the
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Bradley expressed this second point stating:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitu-
tional liberty and security. . . .It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it
is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property.'"
Similarly, cases construing the fifth amendment's protection
against self-incrimination embrace the proposition advanced by va-
rious members of the Court that government illegality offends
more than a particular constitutional protection, that it offends the
very essence of liberty.
Decisions analyzing the function of the fifth amendment, insofar
as it relates to the goal of ascertaining truth at a criminal trial,
indicate that its purpose transcends such a goal.155 The recognition
that a basic principle of justice is protected by the guarantees of
the fourth and fifth amendments was clearly expressed in Justice
Brandeis' prophetic dissent in Olmstead v. United States.15' He
observed, "[t]he protection guaranteed by the Amendments is
much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness ...
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men.' ' 5 7 Justice Brandeis warned future genera-
tions of the inevitable consequences of permitting governmental il-
legality, and argued that such conduct was fundamentally at odds
issue was resolved under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 406 U.S. at
363. In Apodaca, where the trial took place subsequent to Duncan, the issue was resolved on
sixth amendment grounds. 406 U.S. at 411-12.
154. 116 U.S. at 630. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
155. 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 485. Justice Brandeis' first argument in dissent in Olmstead was to analogize
his refusal to sanction illegality by the government to the common law doctrine of unclean
hands:
The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in connection
with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then aid is denied de-
spite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to maintain respect for law; in order
to promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the judi-
cial process from contamination.
Id. at 484.
157. Id. at 478.
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with the very notion of a government designed to protect liberty.1"
The significance of the protections of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments transcends the importance of the particular concerns these
amendments address. Each amendment seeks to secure the free-
dom of the indvidual against a specific type of governmental intru-
sion. But, it is the protection of an individual's freedom against
unjust governmental intrusion, regardless of the manner in which
it may occur, that constitutes the primary purpose of the constitu-
tional provisions protecting the liberty interest.
B. The Liberty Interest and Law Enforcement Illegality
Courts have made only limited use of the liberty interest to pro-
tect against illegal conduct by law enforcement officers. Although
the Supreme Court has continually recognized that the liberty in-
terest was at stake when violations of rights protected by the
fourth and fifth amendments occurred,5 the Court has never re-
solved the issues in these cases on the basis of the liberty interest
because the language of the two amendments was considered suffi-
cient to prohibit illegal searches and seizures and coerced confes-
sions. 160 When an incident arose of such stunning brutality as the
stomach-pumping in Rochin,'6' the Court refused to settle the
matter on strict fourth or fifth amendment grounds. In order to
find constitutional foundation for condemnation of conduct which
158. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
159. See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
160. Recent restrictions in the applicability of the fourth amendment,'see United States
v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), which is now based on a "legitimate expectation of privacy,"
may lead to a situation where a court faced with a reading of the fourth amendment which
allows law enforcement agents wide latitude in conducting searches, may turn to the due
process clause to protect a defendant against governmental intrusion. In Payner, the defen-
dant was the victim of an IRS scheme to photograph the contents of a briefcase which
involved breaking and entering and larceny. Because the briefcase did not belong to the
defendant, the Court determined that despite the IRS's "possibly criminal behavior," lack
of the legitimate expectation of privacy denied the defendant the protections of the fourth
amendment. The district court had suppressed the evidence under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment; the dissent in the Supreme Court looked to its supervisory powers
over the federal judicial system to suppress evidence the government obtained through mis-
conduct. 100 S. Ct. at 2451 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the rationale
for suppression of evidence under the supervisory powers is two-fold: first, to deter illegal
conduct and second, to protect the integrity of the federal courts. See Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
161. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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"shocked the conscience," the court resorted directly to the liberty
interest, embodied in the due process clause.162
In the context of the entrapment defense,"' a minority of the
Court maintains that a consideration of the type of conduct en-
gaged in by law enforcement officers is appropriate for determining
the applicability of the defense. 164 The justices who adhere to this
position do not indicate whether it has constitutional founda-
tion. 6 5 Nevertheless, a majority of the Court has rejected the invi-
tation to study the implications of law enforcement illegality and
has held that the entrapment defense does not have a constitu-
tional basis. Therefore, reliance on the entrapment defense as a
basis for the defense of law enforcement illegality is precluded by
the holdings in the entrapment cases.
Third, with regard to the Ker-Frisbie rule, the Supreme Court
has expressly rejected the argument that illegal conduct by law en-
forcement agents intended to bring a defendant within the juris-
diction of the trial court is sufficent to deny jurisdiction to that
court. 66 The Second Circuit, however, held in United States v.
Toscanino1 67 that the expansion of the Supreme Court's reading of
the due process clause formed the basis for overruling the Ker-
Frisbie rule.1 8 Although Toscanino has not been expressly over-
ruled, subsequent decisions have limited its scope to incidents in-
volving brutality.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has continued to recognize that
the due process clause does have a role in protecting individuals
from law enforcement illegality. In United States v. Archer,1 9 the
162. Id. at 172.
163. The defense of entrapment has been codified in the proposed reform of the federal
criminal laws. S 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1979).
164. See O'Connor, supra note 10, at 39.
165. See notes 61, 68 supra and accompanying text.
166. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975), where the Court held that even
though assessment of probable cause by a prosecutor alone does not satisfy the fourth
amendment, failure to obtain a judicial assessment of probable cause will not be grounds to
vacate a conviction (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) and Ker v. Illinois, 119
U.S. 436 (1886)).
167. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
168. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975);
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975).
169. 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Second Circuit, when confronted with a law enforcement scheme
which brought into question the integrity of the judicial system,
was tempted to find a due process violation but instead reversed
the conviction on a narrower ground. 17 0 Judge Oakes, although
concurring in Lira, expressed his concern that if the court con-
doned illegal conduct by law enforcement officials it might signal a
failure to heed Justice Brandeis' admonition that a government
that breaks its own laws "breeds contempt for law. '1 71
The New York courts have also followed the trend which argues
for an expanded reading of the due process clause. In People v.
Isaacson,171 the New York Court of Appeals decided that the con-
cept of conduct repugnant to a sense of justice includes illegalities
involving deceit and other misconduct, whether or not an element
of physical brutality was present. According to the court, such con-
duct could become so repugnant to societal notions of fair play
that it becomes illegal, thereby affording a defendant subject to
such conduct a defense of law enforcement illegality."7 ' Similarly,
in People v. Rao,1 7 4 the Appellate Division held that misconduct by
law enforcement officials violated the defendant's due process in-
terest thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction over the
defendant.
The development of the law in these cases broadens the due pro-
cess clause beyond the limited proposition of Rochin that law en-
forcement illegality in the form of physical brutality, violates a de-
fendant's due process liberty interest.1 75 The limitation of the
liberty interest, however, to instances of gross physical brutality is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of liberty in
other instances.17 6 The Supreme Court has resorted to the due pro-
170. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
171. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d at 72 (citing Olmstead v. United States; 277 U.S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
172. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 520, 378 N.E.2d 78, 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 720 (1978).
173. Id.
174. See notes 127-34 supra and accompanying text.
175. 73 A.D.2d 88, 425 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1980). See notes 71-74 supra and accom-
panying text.
176. This inconsistency is highlighted by the following hypothetical guidelines which
could be issued to police under the Ker-Frisbie rule:
1) You may illegally break into the suspect's residence in order to return him to the
jurisdiction of the trial court but if, while there, you observe evidence of a crime, leave it
behind because it would be inadmissible due to the illegal entry.
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cess liberty interest in various contexts not involving physical bru-
tality which had theretofore not been expressly considered, but
which violated the essence of what the due process clause was
designed to protect. For example, when an ordinance gave neither
notice to the prospective criminal of what actions constitute a
crime, nor standards to the police for determining who had vio-
lated the statute, the Court invalidated the statute as violative of
the right of liberty.1 77 The Court has held that the due process lib-
erty interest is also violated when an individual is punished for a
crime even though that individual lacked the element of mens
rea, 1 78 or when an individual is convicted without any evidence.1 79
The concept of due process illustrated by the holdings in the
three Supreme Court decisions discussed above demonstrates that
an individual may not be deprived of his liberty except through
lawful means. This principle is applicable whether the illegality
takes the form of physical brutality or some other more sophisti-
2) You may brutalize the suspect before leaving the residence but not to the point that
he confesses to the crime. The confession would be inadmissible as unconstitutionally co-
erced. (Also, while you may brutalize him, you may not brutalize him too much because,
then, the Rochin expectation may become applicable.)
3) As you return the suspect to the jurisdiction, impress upon him that he is being ille-
gally kidnapped. If you arrest him he would be entitled to an attorney.
One writer, discussing the approach of the Second Circuit in Lira and Lujan, has pointed
out the inconsistency as follows:
Thus, because only corporeal brutality finds its way into the court's due process
calculus, Lujan does not recognize that the defendant who faces long periods of im-
prisonment is "injured" by an illegal kidnapping as much as the person who is physi-
cally assaulted. Yet both forms of police conduct when tolerated by the courts debase
the judicial process. If the Lujan rationale that legal injury is not a "deprivation"
were to be applied consistently, courts would admit the fruits of an illegal search and
seizure when the "deprivation" is no greater than that which the defendant would
endure through a lawful search - an argument explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.
Greening of a Poisonous Tree, supra note 76, at 706-07.
177. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162-64 (1972). The philosophical
basis for the holding of the Court in Papachristou has been explained in the following
manner:
[Ilf the precept of no crime without a law is violated, say by statutes, being vague and
imprecise, what we are at liberty to do is likewise vague and imprecise. The
boundaires of our liberty are uncertain. And to the extent that this is so, liberty is
restricted by a reasonable fear of its exercise.
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE 239 (1971).
178. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Accord, Lokos v. Capps, 569 F.2d 1362 (5th
Cir. 1978).
179. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
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cated means of infringing upon an individual's freedom. If the pur-
pose of law is to protect liberty, then only by remaining faithful to
that purpose can an individual's liberty be lawfully curtailed.
The Supreme Court has also applied the due process clause
where illegal conduct has contributed to a denial of the liberty in-
terest at trial. Case law demonstrates that the concept of a fair
trial as a precondition to the curtailment of an individual's liberty
interest (which is at the heart of a criminal trial) encompasses ba-
sic precepts not specifically enunciated in the Bill of Rights. The
following cases illustrate that a trial is not a fair one when the
commission of illegalities is instrumental in the presentation of ev-
idence at trial.
In Moore v. Dempsey'" the prosecution procured an indictment
by whipping and torturing witnesses until they testified at defen-
dants' trial as desired and then, conducted a trial in the midst of a
mob. After deliberating for five minutes, the jury returned guilty
verdicts. The Supreme Court made clear that in deciding the case
it did not consider "petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the
question whether their constitutional rights [had] been pre-
served."1 81
In Tunney v. Ohio"'8 a defendant arrested for violating the Pro-
hibition Act was tried, convicted and fined by the mayor of the
town. The mayor received a fee for his service as judge from a fund
made up of fines from convicted defendants. The Court dismissed
the conviction stating:
[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant
in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property to
the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substan-
tial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case."6'
Finally, in Mooney v. Holohan'4 the prosecution knowingly used
perjured testimony to obtain defendant's conviction. The Supreme
Court in overturning the conviction stated:
[The requirements of due process], in safeguarding the liberty of the citi-
180. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
181. Id. at 92. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
182. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
183. Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
184. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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zen against deprivation through the action of the State, embodies the fun-
damental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and politi-
cal institutions. . . . It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be
satisfied by the mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a convic-
tion through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of
depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and
jury by the presentation of evidence known to be perjured. 8
In these cases certain actions were deemed unconstitutional even
though they were not expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
The liberty interest clearly emerges in these cases as an indepen-
dent constitutional right. Although criteria for judging whether
safeguards are provided for the determination of guilt or innocence
have not been fully delineated by the Court, due process requires,
at a minimum, that a defendant whose liberty is subject to impair-
ment has a right to expect that those seeking to enforce the laws of
society will undertake such responsibility by lawful means.
The principle which underlies the fourth and fifth amendments
and the right to a fair trial is designed to protect the individual's
liberty against unwarranted governmental intrusion. This protec-
tion extends to the manner in which an individual is brought to
trial for an alleged crime and the procedural and substantive as-
pects of that trial. The rationale for the principle enunciated in
these constitutional provisions is that an individual, by entering
society, agrees to the possible impairment of his liberty only in ac-
cordance with the laws of that society. The government's use of
means not within the boundaries of the rule of law, which intrudes
upon an individual's liberty, violates the standards under which
the individual agreed to the possibility of suspending his freedom.
Such violation voids the initial provisions of the societal plan
thereby forfeiting the right of the government to utilize the fruits
of that violation to proceed against those who violate the laws they
have agreed not to violate.
The protection of the fourth amendment has been limited in re-
cent Supreme Court decisions, 86 to those instances where a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy has been intruded upon unreasonably.
185. Id. at 112 (emphasis added). See also Napeu v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta
v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
186. United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); Payner v. United States, 100 S.
Ct. 2439 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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Indeed, the Court has justified these limitations stating "Each time
the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost
for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. 18 7 Therefore, the
Court has held that the fourth amendment rights may not be as-
serted vicariously.
A defense of law enforcement illegality based on a violation of
the liberty interest of the due process clause should not be de-
feated by such a standing requirement. Although the rationale be-
hind the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule is deterrence of un-
constitutional searches, the rationale behind the defense of law
enforcement illegality is much more fundamental. What is at stake
in the latter case are two things: 1) the liberty interest of the indi-
vidual, unrestricted by the limitation of the fourth or fifth amend-
ments and 2) the integrity of the legal system itself. Therefore, the
law enforcement illegality defense should be available to anyone
who is able to prove that he was injured by such a violation.' "
In People v. Isaacson,'" the New York Court of Appeals specifi-
cally recognized that an intrusion upon the liberty interest occurs
even when the individual is the ultimate, rather than the immedi-
ate, target of the government illegality.190 The court looked specifi-
cally to the nature of the conduct involved to determine whether
the defendant's rights were violated. It was insignificant to the
court that law enforcement officials had subjected an unindicted
third party to beatings and intimidation, when such conduct ulti-
mately resulted in violation of the defendant's liberty interest.' 91
The decisions finding trial-related conduct violative of a defen-
187. 439 U.S. at 133.
188. An analogy to the exclusionary rule in the context of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments clarifies how this violation occurs. It is no less indirect to use the "fruit of the poison-
ous tree" to obtain evidence against a defendant than to commit illegalities to reach the
same objective. The only distinction between the two would arise if the tree is poisonous in
the first situation because a provision of the Constitution specifically prohibits such con-
duct, but not in the second situation because there is no specific constitutional prohibition.
Yet, if in the second situation there is a provision of the Constitution which prohibits such
conduct, then the question of directness no longer remains. The argument is made in section
III of this Article that the due process liberty interest is an independent constitutional right
which serves to prohibit such conduct. Therefore, when the governmental misconduct vio-
lates the due process liberty interest, the "fruit" of that misconduct should similarly be
excluded at trial.
189. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
190. Id. at 527, 378 N.E.2d at 87, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
191. Id.
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dant's due process rights also demonstrate that one's liberty may
be deprived even when the individual is the ultimate, rather than
the immediate, target of such conduct. 92 The question of direct-
ness, however, can be formulated in a different manner. In the con-
text of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the Supreme
Court has held that evidence obtained from a third party in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment should not be excluded at defen-
dant's trial if the unconstitutional search was directed at a third
party.' In that event, the defendant would have no standing to
object to the introduction of the evidence illegally acquired be-
cause no privacy interest had been violated.
This analysis, however, is inapplicable when violations of the
due process liberty interest occur. The expectation of privacy pro-
tected by the due process liberty interest is the expectation that
one's liberty will be curtailed only in accordance with law. The
fourth amendment, and other specific protections of the Bill of
Rights, are specific examples of the basic liberty interest. Arguably,
the protections afforded by such amendments are limited to partic-
ular transgressions committed directly against the defendant.
However, the expectation of the liberty interest must be viewed
within the context of a system of law designed to protect that in-
terest as a whole rather than in a piecemeal fashion. Thus, for pur-
poses of the due process liberty interest, it is irrelevant whether
one's liberty unjustly is curtailed by law enforcement illegalities
aimed directly or indirectly at the defendant. 94
192. See notes 180-83 supra and accompanying text. These cases involved infliction of
brutality on witnesses to insure procurement of desired testimony, a judge who received a
fee only for guilty verdicts and the purposeful use of perjured testimony by the prosecution.
Each of these cases involved illegalities perpetrated against or with third parties, but was
ultimately aimed at the defendant; and in each instance the court found a violation of the
defendant's right to liberty.
193. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
194. See notes 30-36 supra and accompanying text. In addition to the reasoning in the
text, two other facts support the conclusion that Payner is not dispositive of the question of
directness in the context of the due process clause. First, according to Justice Marshall,
dissenting in Payner, the Court did not decide whether a defendant would have standing
under the due process clauses to suppress evidence obtained through outrageous govern-
ment conduct. Id. at 2450 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Second,. the Court has accepted for
review United States v. Morrison, 602 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W.
3845 (June 24, 1980), in which an indictment obtained through allegedly improper conduct
by law enforcement agents was dismissed based on the sixth amendment right to counsel




At the heart of the liberty interest is the premise that rights are
secured, first, by the enactment of laws, and second, by the estab-
lishment of a government subject to the laws. The government is
subject to the laws because it exists not for its own benefit or self-
aggrandizement, but rather, for the protection of rights.'95 When
the government violates those laws which have been entrusted to it
in a sacred covenant, then the liberty of the members of that soci-
ety has been violated.
The content of this natural right of liberty is constant. Judicial
recognition of the content, however, is continually developing. Its
scope, therefore, cannot be considered to be confined to the partic-
ular components of liberty expressly provided for in the Bill of
Rights. In the context of the fourth and fifth amendments, for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has stated that the essence of these pro-
tections is found in the implementation of the principle that "the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law."' 9 This protec-
tion cannot be relegated to obscurity because law enforcement offi-
cials are sophisticated enough to violate the liberty interest in ways
other than those envisioned by the framers of the fourth and fifth
amendments. The public should be guaranteed that those desig-
nated with the solemn authority to enforce the laws will exercise
that authority within the bounds of the law. Absent such a guaran-
tee, illegal conduct by law enforcement officials may invade "not
only the rights of these defendants but that of every man, woman
and child in the State.' 19 7 To ensure the protection of the liberty
interest against unjust governmental intrusion by means of law en-
forcement illegality, legislation is needed which would authorize
the exclusion, based on a defense of law enforcement illegality, of
any evidence obtained or results produced by means of such ille-
195. St. Thomas More, in Utopia, eloquently expressed the principle stated in the text
as follows:
"Why do you suppose they made you king in the first place?" I ask him. "Not for
your benefit, but for theirs. They meant you to devote your energies to making their
lives more comfortable, and protecting them from injustice. So your job is to see that
they're all right, not that you are."
T. MORE, UTOPIA Book I (1516).
196. Blackburn v. United States, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1959) (quoting Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959)).
197. 46 A.D.2d at 358, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
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gality. The following observation by the court in Rao summarizes
the need for such a law:
"Vigilante Justice" is abhorrent to our concept of jurisprudence whether the
end product be a body dangling from the end of a rope, or a person charged
with a crime as a result of lawless conduct on the part of an overzealous
prosecutor. The latter indeed is reprehensible since both society and the
accused are victimized by one sworn to uphold the law." 8
The principle upon which the defense rests is basic to any system
of jurisprudence which extols justice and liberty as its greatest vir-
tues. No man, no king and no law enforcement agency, is above the
law.
198. 73 A.D.2d at 100, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
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